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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW. By Earl W. Kintner.1 Cincinnati, Ohio:
Anderson Publishing Co. 1980. Vols. I & II. Pp. xvi, 427;
xv, 579. $137.00 for set of two volumes.
Reviewed by W. Donald McSweeney2
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 Mr. Kintner, an experienced antitrust practitioner with a dis-
tinguished background of public service at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, produced the first two volumes of a projected eight volume
treatise on the antitrust laws of the United States. It will, indeed, be a
voluminous work when completed.
The Introduction states that the purpose of the treatise is "to provide
a careful analysis of all of the major federal antitrust statutes, as well as
current legislative thinking and the principal judicial and administra-
tive opinions, rules and guidelines and legal writing on the subject."3
The first two volumes have fulfilled this stated purpose with respect to
the Sherman Act. The basic antitrust statute is well covered.
Volumes I and II are comprehensive compilations of the legal au-
thorities but with scant critical analysis. It is a valuable compilation for
anyone practicing antitrust law as well as for those judging it.
The books are hard cover and seem well-bound, with a pocket for
which pocket supplements are promised. Each book contains a de-
tailed table of contents of only that volume, but each contains a useful
index to both volumes.
Volumes I and II cover sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act.
Volumes III and IV will deal with the Robinson-Patman Act and sec-
tions 3, 7, 7A, and 8 of the Clayton Act. Volumes V and VI will deal
with the Federal Trade Commission Act. Volume VII will discuss anti-
trust practice, procedure, and enforcement. The concluding volume
will include a master index, statutes, selected appendices, a table of
1. A.B., 1936, LL.D., 1970, DePauw University; J.D., 1938, Indiana University. Senior
Partner, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C. Former Chairman and General
Counsel, Federal Trade Commission. Member, District of Columbia and Indiana bars.
2. A.B., 1941, LL.B., 1948, Harvard University. Partner, Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago,
Illinois. Member, Illinois and Massachusetts bars.
3. I E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAws xiii (1980).
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cases, and a bibliography. The absence of a table of cases from the
early volumes is a disadvantage.
II. VOLUME I
In volume I, there is an Introduction to Federal Antitrust laws briefly
discussing laissezfaire, capitalism, socialism, and Marxism in sweeping
terms. It is sort of a truncated social history of America, designed to
place the Sherman Act in its historical perspective. Although rather
high-sounding and somewhat overwritten, it serves its function.
The acknowledgments of assistance are profuse, and the author
states: "From the outset this treatise has been viewed as a project of my
law firm that was undertaken as a service to the legal profession."4 The
volume does perform a "service to the legal profession" in bringing
together a vast amount of authorities to help a lawyer or judge deter-
mine what the law is. It is not, however, a searching critical analysis,
nor does it pretend to teach what the law should be. It is objective and
not argumentative.
The very extensive footnotes add to the value of this treatise as a
research tool. Indeed, the footnotes in many parts of the book must be
considered to understand fully what "the law is." Unfortunately, the
copiousness and fine print of the footnotes detract from the readability.
Part of the useful material in the footnotes might have been included in
the text, and some footnotes might better have been omitted.
Being a "project" of a "law firm," although contributing to the
breadth and depth of the research which went into this valuable work,
may also help account for its somewhat awkward writing style. Also,
the number of "major contributors" possibly proved an obstacle to a
more searching analysis of many of the perplexing problems which
arise under the antitrust laws.
The text of the first volume opens with a chapter on "Economic The-
ory and Policies": "The antitrust laws of the United States are rooted
in a commitment to the promotion of free enterprise and the existence
of competition in the marketplace."5 There follows a summary discus-
sion of economic theory. It is doctrinaire and replete with economic
catchwords, but it is a balanced presentation.
The next chapter traces the English and American common law of
4. Id. at vx.
5. Id. at 1.
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monopoly and trusts before the enactment of the Sherman Act, foot-
noted to many pre-1890 state court cases. It and other sections are rich
in the history of antitrust and interesting to its students. The author
believes that one must know the common-law origins of antitrust to
understand the Sherman Act. There is even an appendix in volume I of
old common-law English and American cases holding restraints to be
reasonable.
Chapter 4 is a lengthy legislative history of the Sherman Act. It is
valuable because it gathers this material in one place. The constitu-
tionality and jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act in both interstate
and foreign commerce are considered in the next chapters. There are
helpfully assembled theories in the relevant cases on special defenses
available in foreign commerce cases: sovereign immunity, act of state
doctrine, and foreign sovereign compulsion.
The first volume concludes with a discussion of the per se and rule of
reason doctrines which is of considerable current interest because of the
rebirth of the latter and the apparent disinclination of the Supreme
Court to extend the per se doctrine.6
A busy practitioner, eager to know "what the law is right now," may
not believe that the first volume is worth buying, but it should be part
of any working antitrust library, particularly so as background for the
second volume.
III. VOLUME II
Volume II, covering sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act, is an
excellent objective presentation of the law supported by a wealth of
authoritative citations of cases, statutes, and legal writings. There are
no innovative approaches to solving problems arising under the Sher-
man Act, and, indeed, pioneering in such efforts does not seem to be
Mr. Kintner's purpose. His presentation is "basic stuff." From a study
of this treatise a student of antitrust could become very well grounded
in the basics of the Sherman Act, but he would have to look elsewhere
for a critique of its application. This treatise in these respects differs
from other recently published antitrust works.7
6. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrTRusT (1977) and P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTIrrrusT LAW (1978, 1980). For a comparison of the three treatises, see Adelman,
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The specific practices which violate section 1 are discussed in detail.
Next, monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to mo-
nopolize under section 2 are covered, compared, and contrasted. One
section examines the effect of antitrust violations on the enforceability
of contracts, and another discusses section 3, relating the Sherman
Act's reach over United States territories and the District of Columbia.
The discussion of the intent required to establish a Sherman Act vio-
lation' does not make clear the difference announced in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co. 9 between civil and criminal cases. In Gyp-
sum the Court clearly distinguished a criminal from a civil violation'0
in holding that intent was a necessary element of a criminal Sherman
Act violation. Mr. Kintner's interpretation of Gypsum is that its hold-
ing was merely that "general intent" may not "be inferred from the fact
that the defendants engaged in activities which had an anticompetitive
effect."" Actually, Gypsum goes beyond that result and requires more
than what Mr. Kintner calls "general intent." After holding that intent
is a necessary element of the Sherman Act crime, the Court went on to
state what standard of intent is to be applied for finding a violation.' 2
In the section on horizontal price fixing, there is no discussion of the
applicability of the rule of reason and the interesting implications of
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS (ASCAP).' 3 This case is noted under
"copyrights' 4 as if it has no significance beyond "blanket copyright
licenses." The broad language of the case is nowhere mentioned.
There is no recognition of the admonition of Justice White in ASCAP
that certain conduct which might be literal "price fixing" is not per se
in violation of the Sherman Act and that not "all arrangements among
actual or potential competitors that have an impact on price areper se
violations. . . or even unreasonable restraints."' 5 Such recognition of
ASCAP would have provided some balance to the extensive reliance
Book Review, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 891 (1980). For an analytical review of P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra, see Millstein, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REv. 618 (1980).
8. II E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 14-17 (1980).
9. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
10. Id. at 435-36.
11. 11 E. KJNTNER, supra note 8, at 15.
12. 438 U.S. at 443-44.
13. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
14. II E. KINTNER, supra note 8, at 113-14.
15. 441 U.S. at 23.
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on, and references to, United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. 16 The
emphasis on Socony- Vacuum suggests that no type of so-called "price
fixing" escapes per se condemnation.
The current significance attributed to United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (ALCOA) t7 throughout the discussion of section 2 fails to
accord sufficient importance to the several recent rulings which deny
section 2 claims.18 At least one commentator notes "the demise of AL-
COA" and believes it was given a "decent burial" in the Second Cir-
cuit. 9 The recent cases are not omitted from the treatise, but they are
overshadowed by ALCOA and lost in the almost indiscriminate citing
of so many writings.
In discussing the requirement of showing a dangerous probability of
success to prove attempt to monopolize, although clearly recognizing
the rejection outside of the Ninth Circuit of Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co. 20 and its progeny,z ' Mr. Kintner devotes a surprising amount of
space to this minority view.2 2 Once again, however, Mr. Kintner re-
frains from taking a position, although he expressly recognizes that
Professor Turner had espoused abandonment of the dangerous
probability requirements even prior to Lessig.23
Although below-cost pricing evidencing intent to monopolize is men-
tioned,24 there is no discussion as to what constitutes predatory pricing
or what is meant by "below cost." Mr. Kintner does not enter the cur-
rent debate on this subject.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Kintner does not, unlike some other authors, question the role of
antitrust in our society. Although the Kintner treatise is not required
reading for the antitrust expert, it is an important work in the field.
The library of antitrust practitioners and judges will be enriched by it.
16. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). References to the case are in II E. KINTNER, supra note 8, at 63-64,
72-74, 84.
17. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex
C6rp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 432 U.S. 802 (1975).
19. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1980).
20. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
21. II E. KINTNER, supra note 8, at 427.
22. Id. at 423-31.
23. Id. at 428.
24. Id. at 414 n.58.
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